Mercer Law Review
Volume 64
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 16

12-2012

Real Property
Linda S. Finley

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons

Recommended Citation
Finley, Linda S. (2012) "Real Property," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 64 : No. 1 , Article 16.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol64/iss1/16

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Given continued economic issues, it is tempting to turn any survey of
Georgia real property law into a report solely about foreclosure law. The
survey period of this Article-from June 1, 2011, through May 31,
2012' 1-saw continued dire economic times for Georgia and the entire
United States. As this Article was going to print, RealtyTrac, which
reports national foreclosure statistics, released its mid-year 2012
foreclosure report showing that foreclosure activity had again increased
in 125 of the nation's 212 metropolitan areas. Of the metropolitan
areas making up the top ten on the foreclosure report, only Atlanta
registered an increase in foreclosure during the first half of 2012.3 The
courts and the Georgia General Assembly continue to address issues

* Shareholder in the law firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (BA., 1978); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, and the United States Supreme
Court.
The Author wishes to give special thanks to Kitty S. Davis, who, year after year, has
graciously handled the administrative tasks in bringing this Article to print. Additional
thanks goes to Robert A. "Andy" Weathers, Esq. (Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law, J.D., 1966) whose guidance is reflected in this Article; and, Carol V. Clark,
Esq. (University of Georgia, J.D., 1976) for her assistance, research, and analysis.
Particularly, the Author directs the reader to Carol V. Clark, 2012 Judicial Update, 2012
REAL PROPERTY LAW INSTITUTE MATERIALS (Institute of Continuing Legal Education in
Georgia 2012).
1. For an analysis of Georgia real property law during the prior survey period, see
Linda S. Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 63 MERCER L. REV. 309
(2011).
2. RealtyTrac, 59 Percentof US. Metros Post HigherForeclosureActivity in FirstHalf
of2012, availableathttp://www.realtytrac.com/content/foreclosure-market-reportmidyear2012-metro-foreclosure-market-report-7305.
3. Id.
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concerning the foreclosure process and other real property issues that
arise either directly or incidentally because of the foreclosure dynamic.
It appears these issues will continue to be around for some time.
II. LEGISLATION
With foreclosure on the minds of members of the General Assembly,
work was done to lessen its impact on Georgia families and communities.
In an effort for communities to keep abreast of who has title to
properties that have been foreclosed (and likely to hold those who
purchase foreclosed property accountable for conditions of the property),
House Bill 1104 was enacted to provide standards for local and county
governments that elect to enact ordinances requiring owners to register
vacant real property.' The statute defines "foreclosed real property"
and "vacant real property"7 and limits the information that the county
or municipality may require.8 Fees for registration are limited to a
maximum of $100 per registration s Penalties for failure to register or
failure to update registration information cannot exceed $1,000.10 An
owner of vacant property may request exemption from registration if
certain requirements are met and may challenge a county's determination that a property is vacant.
Following a national trend where large-scale lenders are targets of
federal investigations,2 the General Assembly expanded the definition
of "mortgage fraud."" Section 16-8-101 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 14 was amended to expand the scope of what may
be investigated as mortgage fraud by including in the definition of
"mortgage lending process:" (1) "the execution of deeds under power of

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ga. H.R. Bill 110, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-14 (Supp. 2012)).
Id. § 1 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-14(b)).
Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-14(a)(3)).
Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-14(a)(5)).

Id. (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-14(c)).
Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 44-14-14(h)).
Id. (codified at O.C.G-.A § 44-14-14(i)).

Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 44-14-14(j)).
Andrew Dunn, Justice Department Probes Wells Fargo Lending Practices,

CHARLOrr OBSERVER, May 8,2012, availableathttp://www.charlotteobserver.com/201 2/05-

/08/3227414/justice-dept-probes-wells-fargo.html; Press Release, U.S. Department of
Justice, $1 Billion to be Paid by The Bank ofAmerica to the United States (Feb. 9, 2012),
available at httpl/www.justice.gov/usao/nyelpr/2012/2012febo9.html; Citigroup Under
Investigation, INVESTORS.COM (Feb. 24,2012), availableat http://news.investors.com/02 2 412-602270-citigroup-under-investigation.aspx.
13. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-102 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
14. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-101 (2011 & Supp. 2012).
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sale" (foreclosure deeds); and (2) the execution of assignments
vesting
15
the secured creditor with title to the security instrument.
Although most attention was placed on the provisions regarding
residential property, foreclosure of commercial property was not ignored.
Senate Bill 33316 amends O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.317 to require the same
notice required in residential foreclosure to be provided to commercial
property owners prior to foreclosure sales. 8
Following the Federal Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act of
2009,19 which provided rights to tenants who reside in property
foreclosed during their tenancy,20 House Bill 44521 was enacted to give
such tenants similar protection under Georgia law.22 The statute
provides various protections to bona fide tenants,23 provides the tenant
24 and codifies
a period of ninety days before he or she can be 2evicted,
5
a mechanism for recovery of the security deposit.

Revisiting the Georgia Supreme Court's 2003 advisory opinion26-- which stated that the preparation and execution of a deed of
conveyance by anyone other than an attorney licensed in Georgia
constituted an unauthorized practice of law27-- the General Assembly
amended O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13 28 to codify the advisory opinion and
formally legislate the requirement that only a "lender or an active
member of the State Bar of Georgia" can conduct a closing or disburse
settlement proceeds. 29 The statute goes further than the advisory
opinion, applying the attorney requirement to both new loans and
transactions to refinance made by a current or a new lender.31 Civil

penalties are enacted for any person violating the statute as $1,000 or
double the amount of interest payable on the loan for the first sixty days

15. O.C.G.A. § 16-8-101(1).
16. Ga. S. Bill 333, Reg. Sess. (2012) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3 (Supp. 2012)).
17.
18.
19.

O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.3 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
Ga. S. Bil 333 § 1.
12 U.S.C. § 5201 (Supp. 2010).

20. Id.
21. Ga. H.R. Bill 445, Reg. Sess. (2012) (to be codified in scattered sections of O.C.G.A.
§ tit. 44 ch. 7 (Supp. 2012)).
22. Id.
23. Id. § 3 (to be codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55.1(d) (Supp. 2012)).
24. Id. (to be codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55.1(b)(1) (Supp. 2012)).
25. Id. § 1 (to be codified at O.C.GA § 44-7-38 (Supp. 2012)).
26. In re UPL Advisory Opinion, 2003-2, 277 Ga. 472, 588 S.E.2d 741 (2003).
27. Id. at 473, 588 S.E.2d at 741.
28. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
29. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(a)(10).
30. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(b).
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after closing, whichever is greater;" it also creates a misdemeanor
crime punishable by a fine, of up to $1,000 and up to twelve months
imprisonment for each violation."
33

III. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY
In Chase Manhattan Mortgage Corp. v. Shelton,'

the Georgia

Supreme Court addressed the effect of a mortgagor's conveyance of a
portion of his equitable interest in a mortgaged property to his minor
children on subsequent holders of legal and equitable title. 5
On June 30, 1998, Shelton acquired title to the property via warranty
deed. On the same day, he executed two security deeds transferring
legal title of the property to secure repayment of the debt. In September
1998, Shelton conveyed his equitable interest in the property to his wife
(the Shelton children), each of them receiving a oneand two children
36
third interest.
When Shelton refinanced the property two years later, the new lender,
Choice Capital Funding, Inc. (Choice Capital) refused to refinance the
property unless the children's names were removed from the chain of
title. To this end, the Sheltons hired an attorney to petition the probate
court to appoint the children's mother as legal guardian of their interest
in the property. However, the probate court never appointed Shelton's
wife as the children's conservator. 7 in September 2000, Shelton's wife
executed and recorded a quitclaim deed purportedly conveying both her
interest and the children's interest back to Shelton, signing the deed
once for herself and twice as "Guardian of'each child.'8 Shelton then
executed a security deed in favor of Choice Capital and used the loan

31. O.C.G.

§ 44-14-13(e).

32. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-13(f).
33. This section was authored by Kristin S. Miller, attorney at the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Agnes Scott College
(BA, Phi Beta Kappa, 2005); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2009).
34. 290 Ga. 544, 722 S.E.2d 743 (2012).
35. Id. at 544-45, 722 S.E.2d at 745.
36. Id. at 544, 722 S.E.2d at 745.
37. Id. at 544-45, 722 S.E.2d at 745; see also O.C.G.A. § 29-1-1(2) (2007) (defining
"[c]onservator" to include "guardian of the property appointed prior to July 1, 2005"). The
General Assembly rewrote the guardianship code, Title 29, effective July 1, 2005. See
Mary F. Radford, Wills, Trusts,Guardianships,and FiduciaryAdministration,56 MERCER
L. REv. 457, 477-78 (2004). The revision updated the code's terminology to accord with the
majority of states. See O.C.G.A. § 29-1-1. A "guardian of the property" is now called a

"conservator," while a "guardian of the person" is simply called a "guardian." See id.
38. Shelton, 290 Ga. at 545, 722 S.E.2d at 745.
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proceeds to pay off the original
security deeds, which were cancelled of
3
1
2000.
December
in
record
Choice Capital later assigned the security deed to Household Finance
Corporation (HFC), who foreclosed on the property in December 2002.
In August 2003, HFC conveyed the property to Brian and Keily Johnson
(the Johnsons), who financed the purchase with a loan from Chase
Manhattan Mortgage Corporation (Chase) and a Chase affiliate. The
Johnsons later paid off the security deed in favor of the Chase affiliate
and executed a new security deed in favor of USAA Federal Savings
Bank (USAA). In April 2008, the Shelton children, through appointed
counsel, sued to quiet title to the property naming the Johnsons and the
holders of the two security deeds, Chase and USAA, as defendants. In
December 2010, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
the Shelton children, holding each held clear title to a one-third
undivided interest in the property. Chase, USAA, and the Johnsons
(appellants) appealed.40
In affirming the trial court's decision, the Georgia Supreme Court
rejected the appellants' argument that they were bona fide purchasers
such that equity would require their property interests be unaffected by
the Shelton children's interest.4 1 The supreme court noted that bona
fide purchaser status requires "lack of actual or constructive notice of the
outstanding interest in the property." 2 Here, the supreme court
reasoned, the chain of title included the 2000 quitclaim deed from
Shelton's wife to him, which showed on its face that the mother was the
children's purported guardian.43 The supreme court held that under
the circumstances, the appellants were "on notice of the need to confirm
the mother's
legal authority" 4 to convey her children's property
45
interest.
The Georgia Supreme Court also upheld the trial court's finding that
the children acquired a two-thirds interest in the property from the
original quitclaim deed, noting that it was undisputed that Shelton held
equitable title, which is freely transferrable, when he transferred it to

39.

Id.

40. Id. at 545-46, 722 S.E.2d at 745-46.
41. Id. at 546-47, 722 S.E.2d at 746.
42. Id. at 547, 722 S.E.2d at 746.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 547, 722 S.E.2d at 746-47 (noting that "[a]lthough the law treats parents as
the natural guardians of their children, it does not give parents an unfettered right to
dispose of their children's interests in real property").
45. Id. at 547, 722 S.E.2d at 747 (citing DANIEL F. HINKEL, PINDAR's GA. REAL ESTATE
LAW & PROCEDURE § 26-49 (6th ed. 2004) ("The validity of a guardian's appointment is the
first point to be examined.")).
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his children in 1998.46 Moreover, because Shelton's wife was never
appointed conservator, the 2000 quitclaim deed was only effective in
conveying her one-third equitable interest, leaving the children's twothirds interest intact.4 7 The court stated, "When the [o]riginal [slecurity [dleeds were paid off and cancelled of record in December 2000, legal
title automatically reverted to Shelton and his assigns-his two
children."'
Thereafter, Shelton could only convey the interest he
held.49 Thus, when he executed the new security deed in favor of
Choice Capital, he conveyed only his one-third interest in the property,
which was all that was assigned to the foreclosing party and ultimately
the only interest appellants received.5"
Disputes concerning control of church-owned property when a
congregation splits from its parent church continue to raise critical
property, trust, and First Amendment issues in Georgia courts. In 2011,
this Survey addressed the Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Rector,
Wardens & Vestryman of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc. (Christ Church), 51 then on appeal to
the Georgia Supreme Court.52 The Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari and issued a long and detailed opinion analyzing the title
instruments, Georgia trust statutes, and local and national church
documents.53 The issue before the court was not ownership in terms of
legal title but rather "[t]he question presented [was] who controls that
property.54

The supreme court began its lengthy opinion by recognizing that the
First Amendment limits the manner in which secular courts resolve
property disputes involving churches and religious organizations.5 5
Specifically, when secular courts are called to resolve property disputes
in hierarchical religious denominations, they must apply "neutral
principles of law" to determine who has the right to control church
property and "avoid[] any inquiry into religious doctrine."5 6 This

46. Id. at 548, 722 S.E.2d at 747 (citing Hinkel, supra note 45, at § 21-49).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 548-49, 722 S.E.2d at 747-48.
50. Id. at 549, 722 S.E.2d at 748.
51. 305 Ga. App. 87, 699 S.E.2d 45 (2010).
52. See Finley, supra note 1, at 313-16.
53. Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of the
Episcopal Diocese of Georgia, Inc., 290 Ga. 95, 718 S.E.2d 237 (2011).
54. Id. at 96, 718 S.E.2d at 241.
55. Id. at 96-97, 718 S.E.2d at 241.
56. Id. at 97, 718 S.E.2d at 241.

20121

REAL PROPERTY

neutral principles analysis requires consideration of title instruments,
statutes, and church-goveriing documents. 57
While the supreme court stated the court of appeals may have erred
by applying Georgia statutes governing the holding of church properties
to the property at issue, 8 it determined the issue was not dispositive
and need not be decided to resolve the case.59 The supreme court
agreed with the court of appeals that the title instruments did not create
a trust in favor of the parent church and found that no trust was created
under Georgia "express (or implied) trust statutes." 0 Nevertheless, like
the court of appeals, the supreme court held that the application of the
neutral principles doctrine demonstrates "that an implied trust in favor
of the [parent church] exists on the property of [the break-away
congregation].'6
On the same day, the Georgia Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion in Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, Inc. v. Timberridge
PresbyterianChurch, Inc. (Timberridge Presbyterian Church)," through
a slightly different analysis. In that case the court considered a property
dispute between the local and national bodies of a hierarchical
church. 3 Timberridge Presbyterian Church (Timberridge) sits on
property owned by Timberridge Presbyterian Church, Inc. (TPC Inc.), a
corporate entity specifically formed to hold and control the Timberridge
property. From 1880 to 1983, Timberridge was a member of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS), the post-Civil War
southern branch of the Presbyterian Church. In 1983, PCUS and the
northern branch of the denomination reunited as Presbyterian Church
(U.S.A.) (PCUSA), and Timberridge became a member of PCUSA.64
In 2007, TPC Inc. filed suit against the Presbytery of Greater Atlanta,
Inc. (Presbytery), which represented PCUSA in this action, seeking a
declaratory judgment that TPC Inc. owned all the Timberridge property
and did not hold it in trust for the benefit of PCUSA. TPC Inc. amended
its complaint to seek to quiet title. Presbytery counterclaimed that TPC
Inc. held the property in trust for the benefit of PCUSA and should be
enjoined from transferring the property. In November 2007, a majority
of the Timberridge congregation voted to disaffiliate from PCUSA. In

57. Id.
58. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-5-46, -47 (2003).
59. Christ Church, 290 Ga. at 100-01, 718 S.E.2d at 244.
60. Id. at 98, 103, 718 S.E.2d at 242, 245.
61. Id. at 118, 718 S.E.2d at 255.
62. 290 Ga. 272, 719 S.E.2d 446 (2011).
63. Id. at 272, 719 S.E.2d at 447.
64. Id. at 272-73, 719 S.E.2d at 447-48.
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January 2008, Presbytery filed an ejectment action against Timberridge,
who then affiliated with a separate denomination.6 5
On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court held that
church documents established a trust in favor of PCUSA as to any
property held by TPC Inc. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed,
holding that application of the neutral principles analysis required a
weighing of the relevant deeds and state statutes, as well as local and
national church documents, and that the national church documents
were not dispositive6 6 Specifically, the court of appeals stated, "In the
absence of some showing of intention and assent on the part of
Timberridge, neutral principles of law cannot support the unilateral
imposition of a trust provision drafted by the purported beneficiary of
and the resulting deprivation of the opposing party's property
the trust
67
rights."

Like the Christ Church matter, the supreme court in Timberridge
began its opinion with a detailed analysis of the First Amendment limits
to the manner in which secular courts resolve disputes involving
Specifically, when secular
churches and religious organizations.6"
courts are called to resolve property disputes in hierarchical religious
denominations, they must apply neutral principles of law. 9 Thus, in
determining whether the local or parent church has the right to control
the property at issue, neutral principles allow consideration of the
relevant deeds, state statutes, and the governing documents of both
religious bodies.70 The objective of this analysis was to determine "'the
intentions of the parties' at the local and national level regarding
beneficial ownership of the property" as expressed before any legal
controversy arose.7'
Applying the neutral principles of law, the court considered the deeds,
Georgia statutes governing trusts, and the local and national governing
church documents.7 2 While the court recognized that the relevant
deeds did not show an intent by the grantors to create a trust, the deeds
also did not "expressly preclude the creation of one."73 Moreover, when

65. Id. at 275, 719 S.E.2d at 449-50.
66. Id. at 275-76, 719 S.E.2d at 450.
67. Id. (quoting Timberridge Presbyterian Church v. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta,
Inc., 307 Ga. App. 191, 200, 705 S.E.2d 262, 269 (2010)).
68. Id. at 276, 719 S.E.2d at 450.
69. Id.

70. Id.
71. Id. at 277, 719 S.E.2d at 450 (quoting Jones v. Wolfe, 443 U.S. 595, 603 (1979))

(internal quotation marks omitted).
72. Id. at 277-86, 719 S.E.2d at 451-57.
73. Id. at 277, 719 S.E.2d at 451.
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Timberridge affiliated with PCUSA in 1983, it brought itself under the
church's national constitution, which expressly states that local churches
hold their property in trust for PCUSA even if legal title is vested in a
corporation. 4
The supreme court then examined O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46, which governs
all deeds of conveyance to any person, church or religious society, or
trustee for the use of the church or religious society, and provides in part
that "all lots of land so conveyed shall be fully and absolutely vested in
[the] church.... ." The court of appeals held the statute inapplicable76
because the deeds at issue did not convey the property to trustees.
The supreme court disagreed, finding that the introductory language of
the statute is disjunctive and governs conveyances to persons, churches,
or trustees."
The heart of the supreme court's opinion was its rejection of the court
of appeals's reliance on Georgia's generic express trust statute, s which
requires, among other things, a writing and clear evidence of intent to
create a trust.79 The supreme court's holding was unequivocal: "[Tihe
fact that a trust was not created under our state's generic express (or
implied) trust statutes does not preclude the implication of a trust on
church property under the neutral principles of law doctrine."80
Specifically, the supreme court determined that by affiliating with
PCUSA in 1983, Timberridge assented to governance by PCUSA's
constitution, which plainly stated that local churches hold their property
in trust for the benefit of the general church.8 1 Having weighed the
neutral principles of law, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals, holding that an implied trust for the benefit of PCUSA exists
on the property to which TPC Inc. holds legal title. 2
Considered together, the two decisions present compelling questions
at the intersection of First Amendment and real property law. On its
petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, Christ
Church frames the issue succinctly: "whether the neutral-principles
doctrine of the First Amendment compels civil courts to enforce a 'trust'
imposed on affiliated churches' properties by provisions in denomination-

74. Id.
75. Id. at 277-78, 719 S.E.2d at 451; see also O.C.G.A. § 14-5-46.
76. Presbytery of GreaterAtlanta, 290 Ga. at 278, 719 S.E.2d at 451.
77. Id. at 278, 719 S.E.2d at 451.
78. O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20 (2011).
79. Presbytery of Greater Atlanta, 290 Ga. at 279-80, 719 S.E.2d at 452; see also
O.C.G.A. § 53-12-20.
80. Presbytery of GreaterAtlanta, 290 Ga. at 281, 719 S.E.2d at 454.
81. Id. at 284, 719 S.E.2d at 455.
82. Id. at 288, 719 S.E.2d at 458.
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al documents, even when those provisions would not otherwise have any
effect under generally applicable rules of state property and trust
law. ym
In Greene v. Greene,84 Lynette Greene, individually and as executrix
of her late husband Lloyd Greene's estate, brought an action for
declaratory judgment concerning the title conveyed by a deed executed
in favor of Lynette Greene and her late husband. The trial court issued
a declaration that (i) the deed conveyed a joint tenancy with a right of
survivorship to Lynette and Lloyd Greene, and (ii) Lynette Greene was
the sole owner of the property.'
The Georgia Court of Appeals began its opinion by stating that "[i]n
construing a deed, the court's overriding goal is to ascertain and give
effect to the intent of the parties."m As the parties' intent is generally
determined from the text of the deed, the court started by looking at the
critical language in the deed, which provided that the Greenes "took the
property 'as tenants in common, for and during their joint lives, and,
upon the death of either of them, then to the survivor of them, in fee
simple, together with every contingent remainder and right of reversion,
and to the heirs and assigns of said survivor."' 87 The court determined
that the language of the deed did two things.8 8 First, it granted the
Greenes each a life estate in the property to be held as tenants in
common and terminated upon death of either person.8 9 Second, it
granted fee simple to the surviving grantee.9 0 Thus, when Lloyd died,
fee simple title to the property vested in Lynette. 9'
The trial court's construction of the deed was challenged by an heir
under Greene's will under O.C.G.A. § 44-6-190,9" which provides, in
relevant part, "[any instrument of title in favor of two or more persons
shall be construed to create interests in common without survivorship."93 The court of appeals held that the first part of the deed

83. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Rector, Wardens & Vestrymen of Christ
Church in Savannah v. The Episcopal Church, 132 S. Ct. 2439 (2012) (No. 11-1166), 2012
WL 991422, at *1.
84. 311 Ga. App. 132, 714 S.E.2d 650 (2012).
85. Id. at 132, 714 S.E.2d at 651.
86. Id. at 132-33, 714 S.E.2d at 651 (quoting Second Refuge Church v. Lollar, 282 Ga.
721, 724-25, 653 S.E.2d 462, 466 (2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 133, 714 S.E.2d at 651.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 133, 714 S.E.2d at 651-52.
91. Id. at 133, 714 S.E.2d at 652.
92. O.C.G.A. § 44-6-190 (2010).
93. Greene, 311 Ga. App. at 133, 714 S.E.2d at 652; see also O.C.G.A. § 44-6-190.
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conveying life estates to the Greenes as tenants in common was in
compliance with the statute.9 4 However, because the second part of the
deed conveyed the remainder in fee simple only to one party-the
surviving tenant in common-the statute did not apply.95 The court
also rejected the heir's argument that Lloyd Greene's will passed his
interest in the property to his estate. 96 Because the life estate conveyed by the deed terminated upon Greene's death, no interest in the
property could have passed to his estate. 7
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's order
declaring Lynette Greene the sole owner of the property and reversed
the trial court's declaration that the deed created a joint tenancy. 98
IV.

ZONING99

In Hamryka v. City of Dawsonville, °° the Georgia Supreme Court
addressed the proper method of appeal for the review of an administrative agency decision sought through an action for a declaratory judgment
and writ of mandamus.'' Appellants, the owners of a tract of real
property in Dawson County, Georgia, contested a rezoning ordinance at
hearings in front of the City of Dawsonville Planning Commission and
the Dawsonville City Council. The city council approved the contested
rezoning ordinance, and the appellants challenged that decision by filing
an action for mandamus and seeking a declaratory judgment. When the
appellants were unsuccessful at the superior court, they appealed via a
direct appeal.0 2
The court initially dismissed the appeal as an improperly filed
discretionary appeal under O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1),' 03 but on a motion
to reconsider filed by appellants, the court asked for a briefing on the
issue.' ° Following the briefing, the court held that regardless of the

94. Greene, 311 Ga. App. at 134, 714 S.E.2d at 652.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 135, 714 S.E.2d at 653.

99. This section was authored by Joseph R. Buller, III, associate at the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Louisiana State
University (B.S., 2004); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2008).
100. 291 Ga. 124, 728 S.E.2d 197 (2012).
101. Id. at 125, 728 S.E.2d at 198.
102. Id.
103. O.C.G.A. § 5-6-35(a)(1) (Supp. 2012). The statute requires that all appeals of
administrative agency decisions be taken through the discretionary appeal process, not
direct appeal.
104. Hamryka, 291 Ga. at 124, 728 S.E.2d at 198.
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styling of the action and the relief sought, the nature of the action was
a challenge to an underlying administrative decision; thus, O.C.G.A. § 56-35(a)(1) applied, and the appeal was dismissed as an improperly filed
discretionary appeal.' °5 The court reasoned that regardless of the type
of action filed to challenge the underlying zoning decision, the key fact
was that the appellants had an opportunity to be heard in front of the
Dawsonville Planning Commission, the Dawsonville City Council, and
the superior court. 06 Thus, in order to obtain further review, appellants were required to submit to the discretionary appeal process.0 7
In East Georgia Land & Development Co. v. Newton County, 08 the
Georgia Supreme Court reversed a summary judgment in favor of the
county and held that when a private party challenges the validity of a
lost zoning ordinance, the judicial establishment of a copy does not moot
the separate legal challenge to the validity of that copy.'0 9 East
Georgia Land & Development Co. (EGL) was denied a zoning compliance
letter by the Newton County Board of Commissioners (Board) and
Newton County Board of Zoning Appeals (BZA) on the grounds that its
proposed use-landfill construction-was barred entirely in Newton
County by a May 21, 1985 Newton County zoning ordinance. EGL sued
in superior court in 1997 to challenge the denial on the grounds that the
1985 ordinance was not attached to the minutes for the meeting in
which it was passed, calling into question the actual text of the
ordinance supposedly relied upon by the Board and BZA. EGL argued
specifically that the failure to attach the ordinance to the relevant board
minutes violated the Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL)."'
After years of litigation, the case was stayed pending the county's
separation action in Newton County Probate Court to establish an
official copy of a lost public record, the relevant zoning ordinance."'
The probate court certified a copy, and EGL appealed to the Georgia
Supreme Court, which affirmed the official copy in 2010.112 The
superior court then granted summary judgment for the county on EGL's
challenge to the authenticity of the ordinance, finding that the issue was
moot based on the supreme court's upholding of the validity of the copy
authenticated in the probate court action."'

105. Id. at 125, 127, 728 S.E.2d at 198, 200.
106. Id. at 126, 728 S.E.2d at 199.
107. Id. at 127, 728 S.E.2d at 200.

108. 290 Ga. 732, 723 S.E,2d 909 (2012).
109. Id. at 734, 723 S.E.2d at 911-12.
110. Id. at 732-33, 723 S.E.2d at 910-11.
111. Id. at 733-34, 723 S.E.2d at 911.

112. E. Ga. Land & Dev. Co. v. Baker, 286 Ga. 551, 554, 690 S.E.2d 145, 149 (2010).
113. Newton Cnty., 290 Ga. at 733, 723 S.E.2d at 911.
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On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed and remanded for
further proceedings on the grounds that the probate court proceedings
establishing the authenticity of the ordinance copy did not answer the
question of whether the failure to attach the ordinance to the meeting
minutes violated the ZPL." 4 The court explained that the ZPL's
standards for properly enacting a zoning ordinance were not addressed
in the probate action; thus, the ordinance copy was nothing more than
evidence to be introduced in the underlying action." 5 Even though the
county had established an exact certified copy of the ordinance passed,
it still had to prove that its failure to attach that ordinance to the May
21, 1985 meeting minutes did not violate the ZPL, a question remaining
for the superior court to handle."'
In Fulton County v. Action Outdoor Advertising, LLC,"' the Georgia
Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment in a consolidated action in
favor of several sign companies that were denied sign permits by several
newly created cities based on sign ordinances that were enacted after the
companies submitted their signage applications.1 ' The sign companies filed applications to construct billboards while their respective
signage locations were situated in then unincorporated Fulton County.
By the time the applications were reviewed and denied, each proposed
signage location was situated in one of three newly created cities: Sandy
Springs, Milton, and Johns Creek. Each city passed a sign ordinance
and assessed the sign applications under these ordinances. The cities
denied the sign companies' applications to construct billboards, and the
sign companies challenged this action in superior court."19
While these suits were pending in the superior court, the Fulton
County sign ordinance was declared unconstitutional under the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution. 120 Thus, at the time
each application was filed, Fulton County had no valid sign ordinance.' 21 The superior court granted summary judgment in favor of
the sign companies, finding that at the time the sign companies filed

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 736, 723 S.E.2d at 913.
Id. at 735-36, 723 S.E.2d at 912-13.
Id. at 736, 723 S.E.2d at 913.
289 Ga. 347, 711 S.E.2d 682 (2011).
Id. at 348, 711 S.E.2d at 684.

119. Id. at 347-48, 711 S.E.2d at 684.
120. Id. at 347-48, 711 S.E.2d at 684-85 (citing Fulton Cnty. v. Galberaith, 282 Ga. 314,
319, 647 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2007) (holding that the Fulton County sign ordinance violated the
First Amendment through its presumption that all proposed signs were unlawful pending

proof from the applicant that the sign was lawful; thus, the ordinance was overly broad,
and the court struck it down in its entirety)).
121. Id. at 348-49, 711 S.E.2d at 685.
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their applications, the absence of any valid ordinance restricting the
signs created a vested property right in each company12to
2 construct the
signs that were permitted under the law at that time.
The county argued on appeal that Fulton County had a valid sign
ordinance with respect to billboards at the time the applications were
filed because those specific sections were not directly considered by the
court when it struck down the ordinance." 2 The supreme court
rejected this argument, finding that because the entire ordinance was
struck for constitutional reasons, each provision was deemed invalid
from the day it was enacted."2 Thus, there was no valid sign ordinance at the time the sign companies filed their applications and no
restriction on the erection of billboards.'25 The court went on to hold
that the lack of any signage restriction created a vested property right
in the sign companies to erect any sign permitted by law. 126 The
subsequent enacting of sign ordinances by the cities could not be applied
retroactively to the sign applications without violating the 127sign
companies' vested rights at the time their applications were filed.
The court further rejected the cities' argument that not all of the
companies possessed vested property rights to erect the billboards when
their applications were filed because not all had signed leases permitting
the construction. 2 s The court reasoned that a permit applicant in
Georgia must show the property rights necessary to follow through with
the activity described in the application in order to have a vested right
in the activity.129 If the activity described in the application is lawful,
the applicant has a right to compel the governmental body to approve
the permit; thus, the vested right is in the approval of the application,
not just the right to carry out the activity.13' The court explained that
Georgia General Assembly's creation of new cities could not affect the
vested rights of the sign companies under article I, section 1, paragraph
32
3
X of the Georgia Constitution,' ' prohibiting retroactive law.1
Utilizing the General Assembly's creation of new cities to reject the sign
applications would be retroactively applying the General Assembly's act

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id. at 348,
Id. at 348,
Id.
Id. at 349,
Id.
Id.
Id. at 350,
Id.
Id.

711 S.E.2d at 684.
711 S.E.2d at 685.
711 S.E.2d at 685.
711 S.E.2d at 686.

GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, para. 10.
132. Action Outdoor Adver., LLC, 289 Ga. at 351, 711 S.E.2d at 686.
131.
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in addition to retroactively applying the sign ordinances passed by the
newly minted cities. 3
V.

EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BouNDARiES'34

In Goodson v. Ford,'35 the Georgia Supreme Court discussed the
extent to which access to an easement may be revoked, limited, and
restricted. 3 ' The dispute centered on a 60 feet wide by 418 feet long
rectangular strip of unpaved land dubbed "Carol Street." Carol Street
ran between the Goodson property and the Eller property, then through
the Ford property to the highway. The Goodsons and the Ellers used
Carol Street to access their property, as well as for customer parking,
receiving deliveries, and parking machinery and equipment. Without
delving too deeply into the relevant real estate transactions, a short
history is required because all three properties descend from a common
owner. The common owner recorded a subdivision plat, which showed
Carol Street in the position that existed at the time of the lawsuit. The
common owner then conveyed the Goodson property and Eller property
to other parties before the properties were eventually conveyed to the
Goodsons and the Ellers, respectively. The deed conveying title to the
Goodsons and the Ellers incorporated by reference the original common
owner's subdivision plat. Thereafter, the original common owner
recorded an affidavit stating her intent to withdraw the subdivision plat.
The original common owner then conveyed her interest in137the Ford
property to a party who eventually conveyed it to the Fords.
Once the Fords acquired the property, they requested that the
Goodsons and the Ellers use Carol Street only as access to their
respective properties and the highway. The Goodsons and the Ellers
took issue with the Fords' request, prompting the Fords to file a petition
to quiet title to the tract of land on which Carol Street sat. The
Goodsons and the Ellers answered and counterclaimed, seeking title to
Carol Street by adverse possession and easement rights. The trial court
appointed a special master, who conducted an evidentiary hearing and
submitted a final report to the trial court. The trial court adopted the
special master's report and proposed order, which dismissed Goodson's

133. Id.
134. This section was authored by Daniel P. Moore, staff attorney at the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Elon University
(B.A., 2005); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2009). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
135. 290 Ga. 662, 725 S.E.2d 229 (2012).
136. Id. at 662, 725 S.E.2d at 231.
137. Id. at 662-63, 725 S.E.2d at 231.
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adverse possession claim and vested title of the tract of land in the
Fords. 3
The title was subject to Goodsons and Ellers's shorted,
twenty-foot-wide easement down Carol Street and restricted use as
"solely for purposes of ingress and egress . . . and ... may not be used
for any ... parking or maintenance or storage of farm equipment

vehicles or goods."" 9
The Goodsons and the Ellers appealed, contending they held legal title
to all of Carol Street by express grant as a result of the recorded
subdivision plat. The Fords countered by arguing that any easement
created under the subdivision plat was extinguished by the original
common owner's recorded affidavit of withdrawal of the subdivision
plat. 4 ' The court disagreed with both positions by holding that where
property is subdivided and conveyed according to recorded plats, the
purchaser does not acquire legal title, as the Goodsons suggested, but
rather, an easement by express grant is created in the areas set aside for
the purchaser's use.'" Moreover, when a recording of a subdivision
plat designates a street for use of the purchaser, a legal presumption is
created that the original common owner "irrevocably dedicated such
streets ...

for the use of all of the lot owners in the subdivision"'

and

thereafter the original common owner is "estopped from denying a
grantee's right to use the streets delineated in the plat."" The court
further held that because the Fords' title was derived from the original
common owner, they were similarly estopped from denying the Goodsons
and the Ellers's use of Carol Street to access their properties.'"
Additionally, the Goodsons and the Ellers sought to reverse the trial
court's reduction in the size of the easement and limitation placed on the
use of Carol Street. 4 5 The Goodsons and Ellers relied on Montana v.
Blount 46 in making their argument.'47 In Montana the Georgia
Court of Appeals held that a recorded subdivision plat created a
rebuttable presumption that the "reasonable enjoyment of the easement

138. Id. at 663, 725 S.E.2d at 231-32.
139. Id. at 663-64, 725 S.E.2d at 232.
140. Id. at 664, 725 S.E.2d at 232.
141. Id. at 665, 725 S.E.2d at 232.
142. Id. at 665, 725 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Stanfield v. Brewton, 228 Ga. 92, 94-95, 184
S.E.2d 352, 354 (1971)).
143. Id. (quoting Zywiciel v. Historic Westside Village Partners, LLC, 313 Ga. App. 397,
400, 721 S.E.2d 617, 621 (2011)).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. 232 Ga. App. 782, 504 S.E.2d 447 (1998).
147. Goodson, 290 Ga. at 665, 725 S.E.2d at 233.
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requires the full use of the... street as platted."4 ' However, because
the Goodsons and the Ellers did not provide the court with a transcript
of the special master's evidentiary hearing, the supreme court held they
could only "presume that the evidence supported the relevant findings
of the special master adopted by the trial court.", 49 Accordingly, the
supreme court found no error in the trial court's adoption of the special
and limited the
master's report, which reduced the size of the easement
50
Goodsons and the Ellers' use of the easement.
In Peck v.Lanier Golf Course, 5' the owner of property adjacent to
a golf course sought an implied easement limiting the golf course to
operate only for golf purposes. Peck purchased a lot in the Canongate
on Lanier Subdivision (Canongate) immediately adjacent to the Lanier
Golf Course. Canongate and Lanier Golf Course were never commonly
owned. In addition, Lanier Golf Course and the developers of Canongate
subdivision reached an agreement where the developers would inform all
prospective lot purchasers that the developers were not affiliated with
Lanier Golf Course in any way, and that the purchase of a lot in the
subdivision granted no membership or use rights of any kind at Lanier
Golf Course. The purchase agreement of the Canongate lots included no
representations about the golf course.'5 2 However, a marketing
brochure for Canongate included photographs of the golf course and
described the subdivision as "nestled in the meticulously sculptured
landscape of the 18-hole golf course.""' Furthermore, the lots immediately adjacent to the golf course were more expensive due to the
proximity of the golf course. 54
In 2006 Lanier Golf Course terminated all membership and announced
its intention to sell the property as a high density development. As a
result, Peck filed a putative class action against Lanier Golf Course
seeking declaratory judgment and injunctive relief claiming he and other
similarly situated landowners acquired an implied easement or implied
restrictive covenant in the golf course. The trial court granted summary
judgment to Lanier Golf Course. Peck appealed.' 55 In fact, Peck had
filed two previous appeals regarding the certification of the class action,
but for the purposes of this Article, it is the court's decision on Peck's

148.
marks
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (quotingMontana, 232 Ga. App. at 786, 504 S.E.2d at 452) (internal quotation
omitted).
Id. at 666, 725 S.E.2d at 233.
Id. at 665-67, 725 S.E.2d at 233-34.
315 Ga. App. 176, 726 S.E.2d 442 (2012).
Id. at 176-78, 726 S.E.2d at 444-45.
Id. at 178, 726 S.E.2d at 445.
Id.
Id. at 176-78, 726 S.E.2d at 444-45.
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alleged implied easement that is discussed. 5 ' Peck's claims were
rooted in two theories. The first was based upon the decision in Forsyth
County v. Martin,'5 ' in which the Georgia Supreme Court granted an
irrevocable easement in a lake to owners of lakefront property because
they demonstrated that there was a subdivision plat clearly designated
to the lake area and that they had paid a premium for their lakefront
property. 5 8 However, because no recorded subdivision plat existed,
Peck attempted to demonstrate a recorded subdivision plat through a
tentative unapproved plat, a marketing brochure, and surveys.'5 9 The
court determined that these items were insufficient to prove the golf
60
course was intended to be included in the subdivision's property.1
Therefore, Peck failed to establish that he acquired an irrevocable
easement in the golf course despite a showing that he paid more for a lot
adjacent to the course.' 6 '
Peck next argued an alternative theory of recovery in which he
attempted to show that he relied upon the developers' oral representations that the golf course would remain on the property in his decision
to purchase the lot adjacent to the course.162 The argument failed
because the evidence was undisputed that the developers explicitly
stated that they were not affiliated with Lanier Golf Course and that the
purchase of a lot granted no membership or use rights of any kind in the
golf course.' 6 3 Furthermore, Peck's closing documents included an
addendum that reiterated a clause in the sales contract, which stated
that "[I o representation, promise, or inducement not included in [the]
contract shall be binding upon any party hereto."'
The court held
that this disclaimer barred Peck from claiming he reasonably relied on
any representation that was not a part of the contract. 6 5 Accordingly,
the court held that Peck was not entitled to any restriction or limitation
in the golf course's use of its property. 6

156. Id. at 177, 726 S.E.2d at 444. See Peck v. Lanier Golf Club, 298 Ga. App. 555, 680
S.E.2d 595 (2009); see also Peck v. Lanier Golf Club, 304 Ga. App. 868, 697 S.E.2d 922
(2010).

157.
158.
at 516.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

279 Ga. 215, 610 S.E.2d 512 (2005).
Peck, 315 Ga. App. at 180, 726 S.E.2d at 446; Martin, 279 Ga. at 217, 726 S.E.2d
Peck, 315 Ga. App. at 180, 726 S.E.2d at 446.
Id.
Id. at 181, 726 S.E.2d at 447.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 182, 726 S.E.2d at 447 (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
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In Interchange Drive, LLC v. Nusloch,6 7 the Georgia Court of
Appeals upheld lot owners' rights in a subdivision's common and
recreational areas, as set forth on the subdivision plat and in the
subdivision's restrictive covenants. 6 ' In Interchange, the developer of
Habersham Plantation Subdivision defaulted on its loan, resulting in the
lending bank foreclosing the subdivision property not previously sold.
The bank was the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and the
foreclosure deed conveyed the developers' remaining interest in the
subdivision property, which included the common and recreational areas.
The common and recreational areas were specifically identified in the
subdivision plat and explicitly defined and granted to the subdivision lot
owners by the Habershamn Covenants. Thereafter, the bank, by limited
warranty deed, conveyed its interest in the subdivision to Interchange
Drive, LLC (Interchange)." 9
Interchange took the position that it was not subject to the Habersham
Covenants because the bank's foreclosure had wiped out the Habersham
Covenants. The subdivision lot owners brought suit seeking a declaratory judgment that they held the right to access the common areas. The
trial court granted the lot owners' rights to use, access, and enjoy the
subdivision's common areas and recreation areas as set forth on the
subdivision plat and in the subdivision's restrictive covenants.
Interchange appealed.170
On appeal, Interchange relied on Springmont Homeowners Ass'n v.
Barber,7 ' arguing it was not subject to any restrictions imposed by the
Habersham Covenants because the bank took title to the subdivision
prior to the restrictions of the Habersham Covenants. 172 However, the
court of appeals distinguished Springmont because the specifics of the
deed following foreclosure in Springmont were not discussed, and the
foreclosing bank specifically stated in a recorded writing that it was not
subject to covenants. 173 Here, the bank acquired legal title before the
execution of the Habersham Covenants, and the bank accepted a deed
that expressly made its interest in the subdivision property subject to
the Habersham Covenants. 174 Therefore, the bank accepted the
Habersham Covenants and Interchange, as grantee, "consent[ed] to be

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

311 Ga. App. 552, 716 S.E.2d 603 (2011).
Id. at 552-53, 716 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 553-54, 716 S.E.2d at 605.
Id. at 555, 716 S.E.2d at 606.
221 Ga. App. 713, 472 S.E.2d 695 (1996).
Interchange,311 Ga. App. at 557, 716 S.E.2d at 607.
Id.; Springmont, 221 Ga. App. at 713, 472 S.E.2d at 696.
Interchange,311 Ga. App. at 557, 716 S.E.2d at 607.
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bound by such covenants and restrictions. " 175 Accordingly, the court
of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, and Interchange was not
subdivision lot owners from using the common
entitled to restrict the
176
and recreation areas.

VI.

TRESPASS AND NUISANCE

17 7

During the survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia
Court of Appeals refined legal principles pertaining to nuisance actions.
Also, the Georgia Department of Natural Resources Environmental
Protection Division (EPD) crafted a compromise with several large
lending institutions intended to control storm water and sediment
discharge.
These developments reduced trespass and nuisance
complaints from neighboring property owners.
In Haarhoff v. Jefferson at Perimeter,L.P. ,
the court of appeals
clarified the circumstances requiring pre-suit notice under O.C.G.A. § 411-5(b).' 79 Haarhoff involved a nuisance action brought by neighbors
against the owner of an adjacent parcel based upon the owner's alleged
failure to clean and maintain detention ponds, which resulted in
increased storm water runoff onto the neighbors' properties." °
O.C.G.A § 41-1-5(b) states that "[pirior to commencement of an action by
the alienee of the property injured against the alienee of the property
causing the nuisance, there must be a request to abate the nuisance."' 8' The trial court granted summary judgment to Jefferson at
Perimeter, L.P. (Jefferson), -the adjacent property owner, because the
neighbors initiated suit without first sending an ante litem notice to
Jefferson. On appeal, the neighbors argued that Jefferson knowingly
increased the flow of storm water onto their properties by failing to
inspect or maintain the detention ponds. They asserted that in
circumstances where the nuisance was known, no affirmative steps were
taken, and the nuisance8 2increased, pre-suit notice under O.C.G.A. § 41-15(b) was not required.

175. Id.
176. Id. at 557-58, 716 S.E.2d at 608.
177. This section was authored by Tracy L. Starr, attorney at the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Clemson University
(BA, 1991); American University (MA, 1997); Georgia State University College of Law
(J.D., 2007).
178. 315 Ga. App. 271, 727 S.E.2d 140 (2012).
179. Id. at 273, 727 S.E.2d at 142; O.C.GA § 41-1-5(b) (1997).
180. Haarhoff,315 Ga. App. at 271-72, 727 S.E.2d at 141.
181. O.C.G.A. § 41-1-5(b) (1997).
182. Haarhoff,315 Ga. App. at 271-73, 727 S.E.2d at 141-42.
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The court of appeals disagreed, stating that "the statutory notice
requirement applies only to an alienee 'who merely acquires property on
which there is an existing nuisance, passively permits its continuance,
and adds nothing thereto. ' ""
Hence, prior to filing suit the injured
party must provide notice of the nuisance to the party allegedly causing
the nuisance, unless the party causing the nuisance took an action which
increased the nuisance.'8 The court stated that the neighbors "presented no evidence that Jefferson 'altered the property' or took any other
affirmative action" that increased the amount of storm water flowing
from its property."8 Thus, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's determination that the neighbors' failure to provide ante litem
notice to Jefferson prohibited them from pursuing their nuisance
claims. l s
In a dispute over excessive noise and vibrations from a power plant,
the Georgia Supreme Court, in Oglethorpe Power Corp. v. Forrister,is7
further defined the character of a permanent nuisance versus a
continuing or abatable nuisance.'"
The distinction can be critical
because the character
of a nuisance-continuing
or permanent-"determines the 'manner in which the statute of limitations [is]
applied."" 9 The four-year statute of limitations begins to run upon
the creation of the nuisance once some portion of the harm becomes
observable. 90 If deemed permanent, the statute of limitations begins
to run from the time the nuisance is first evident.'' The statute of
limitations for an abatable or continuing nuisance, however, may restart:
"'every continuance of the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh
action will lie,' and the statute of limitation will begin to run at the time
of each continuance of the harm." 9 ' The trial court found that the
quantity and quality of noises and vibrations emitted from the power
plant changed in 2004. Therefore, although the plant began operations
in 2000, the nuisance was deemed continuing, the statute of limitation

183. Id. at 273, 727 S.E.2d at 142 (quoting Macko v. City of LawrenceviUe, 231 Ga.
App. 671, 676, 499 S.E.2d 707, 712 (1998)).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. 289 Ga. 331, 711 S.E.2d 641 (2011).
188. Id. at 331, 711 S.E.2d at 642.
189. Id. at 333,711 S.E.2d at 643 (quoting City of Atlanta v. Kleber, 285 Ga. 413,416,
677 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2009)).
190. Id. (citing Kieber, 285 Ga. at 416, 677 S.E.2d at 137); O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30 (2007).
191. Forrister,289 Ga. at 333, 711 S.E.2d at 643.
192. Id. (quoting Kleber, 285 Ga. at 416, 677 S.E.2d at 137).
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2004, and the nuisance claims filed in 2007 were allowed
"restarted" in
193
to proceed.
After the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's ruling, the
supreme court granted certiorari to address the argument that the noise
from the power plant was not a continuing nuisance but a permanent
nuisance because it resulted from a "substantial and relatively enduring
feature of the plan of construdtion or from an essential method of
operation."' 94 It was undisputed that the noise was caused by the
exhaust of the gas turbines traveling at a high rate of speed through
multi-story exhaust stacks (the exhaust silencing system). 95 It was
also undisputed that the exhaust silencing system was "an enduring
feature of the power plant's plan of construction, and the noise emanating from the exhaust stacks result[ed] from the essential method of the
plant's operation."'96 Based on that analysis, the court held that "a
nuisance caused by a 'substantial and relatively enduring feature of the
plan of construction or ... an essential method of operation' is usually
not abatable," and, thus, is a permanent nuisance.'9 7 Because the
court deemed the noises to be permanent and not continuing, the statute
of limitations began to run when the type of noise at issue was first
discernable-in 2000 when the plant began operating.198 Thus, the
nuisance claims based on the types of noises that originated when the
plant began operations were barred because the suit was not filed until
2007, well after the four-year statute of limitations had run. 99
In the last year, the EPD, the state agency responsible for implementing Georgia's environmental statutes and regulations, made great strides
in refining a lending institution's responsibility for preventing storm
water and sediment discharge from properties foreclosed upon during
construction.
General Permit No. GAR100003, "Authorization To
Discharge Under The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
Storm Water Discharges Associated With Construction Activity For

193. Id. at 332, 711 S.E.2d at 642-43.
194. Id. at 333, 711 S.E.2d at 643.
195. Id. at 335, 711 S.E.2d at 644.
196. Id. at 335, 711 S.E.2d at 645.
197. Id. at 335, 711 S.E.2d at 644; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 cmt.
c (1977).
198. Forrister,289 Ga. at 335, 711 S.E.2d at 645.
199. Id. at 336, 711 S.E.2d at 645. Because the record revealed a factual dispute
regarding a different noise that was not observable before 2004 and, thus, not barred by
the statute of limitations which ran prior to the filing of the suit, the supreme court
determined that full summary judgment on the nuisance claims was not proper.
Accordingly, the court allowed the nuisance claims pertaining to the post-2004 noise to
proceed. Id.
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Common Developments," requires developers and owners of residential
subdivisions to implement and maintain a complex set of erosion
controls.20 0 Storm water and sediment discharge must be controlled
from the roads, infrastructure, and other common areas, as well as the
individual lots. 201 Many erosion controls, such as storm water detention ponds, are located on common areas. This becomes problematic
because the common areas typically remain on the property of the
financially-stressed developer when lending institutions foreclose upon
the individual lots in the subdivision. Consequently, the lending
institutions do not have the right to enter the common areas and
conduct maintenance activities, as required by the General Permit.0 2
Slowly, lending institutions began to realize that they now owned
thousands of properties on which they were responsible for complying
with general permit requirements, including expensive storm water and
sediment discharge monitoring, daily inspections, and maintenance. Yet,
the institutions had no knowledge of monitoring or maintenance
activities or whether such activities were even being conducted. In
response to the realization that the foreclosure of a property under
construction represented financial and legal responsibilities for which
they had not accounted, the lending institutions began to question the
need for general permit coverage. They argued that since no construction activity
was occurring, no general permit coverage was re20 3
quired.
Rather than engage in costly and drawn-out legal battles over these
issues, EPD engaged with several of the large lending institutions and
developed a compromise. 2" As part of the compromise, the lending
institutions agreed to:
Establish a program to stabilize conditions at foreclosed properties
where land disturbing activities or construction activities have
previously occurred, []inspect each property to evaluate current
conditions, and [identify the potential for storm water impacts[;] ...
prioritize all foreclosed properties based on the potential for adverse

200. The General Permit is available on EPD's website at http-/gaepd.org/FilesPDF/techguide/wpb/FINALStormWaterNPDESPermiLCommonDevelopmentGAR100003_Y2008.pdf.
201. Albert K. Langley, Jr., Bank-Held Propertiesand Compliance with Storm Water
Discharge Requirements, PERSPECTIVES ON GEoRGIA's ENVIRONMENT (Envtl. L. Section of
the State Bar of Ga.), Summer 2012, at 16, availableat http://www.gabar.orgcommitteesprogramssections/sections/environmentaUaw/uploadSummer_12_ELS.pdf (last visited Aug.
27, 2012).

202. Id. at 16-17.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id.
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environmental impacts due to storm water discharge[;] ... [d]evelop
and maintain a database of properties[,]... includ[ing] documentation
of actions taken for each property[;] ... [and] [ilnform any purchaser
.. of the requirement to obtain a stormwater construction permit for
land disturbing activities.' °
In exchange, the agency agreed that once a property achieved
stabilization and storm water and sediment discharges were appropriately controlled, no further action by the lending institution was required.
In addition, if EPD received a complaint about a property maintained by
the lending institutions, rather than immediately issue a violation or
citation, it would contact the institution, review the complaint, and
discuss a response. 206
The agreements between the lending institutions and the agency were
memorialized in a series of consent orders between the EPD and
individual institutions. The agency has gone on record to say that since
implementation of the consent orders, it has received very few complaints regarding sediment loss from foreclosed properties, and those
they did receive were quickly resolved."'
VII.

FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY 208

When is a foreclosure not a foreclosure? In Tampa Investment Group,
Inc. v. Branch Banking & Rust Co.,2" 9 the Georgia Supreme Court
affirmed a decision by the Georgia Court of Appeals that addressed the
essential question of whether a non-judicial foreclosure sale had occurred
where the foreclosing lender cried the sale, but rather than issuing a
deed under power, opted to rescind the sale.210 The lender filed suit
against the borrower and guarantors, and the trial court granted partial
summary judgment to the borrowers because the lender was barred from
seeking a deficiency since it foreclosed and then failed to confirm the
foreclosure sale.2 ' The supreme court affirmed the court of appeals's
ruling that reversed the trial court's decision on this issue. 12 The
supreme court based its decision largely on the statute of frauds, holding

205. Id. at 17-18.
206. Id. at 18.
207. Id.
208. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, associate at the law firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell &Berkowitz, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University
(B.., 1999); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., 2002).

209. 290 Ga. 724, 723 S.E.2d 674 (2012).
210. Id. at 725-26, 731, 723 S.E.2d at 677, 681; see Legacy Cmtys. Grp., Inc. v. Branch
Banking & Trust Co., 310 Ga. App. 466, 713 S.E.2d 670 (2011).
211. Tampa Inv. Grp., Inc., 290 Ga. at 724, 723 S.E.2d at 676.
212. Id. at 726-27, 723 S.E.2d at 678.

20121

REAL PROPERTY

279

that the foreclosure sale is only official and effective where there is a
writing, typically the deed, under power, binding the lender to the
sale. 13 Because no deed under power was executed or delivered, no
foreclosure sale was consummated, and the Georgia statute requiring
confirmation did not apply to bar the lender from suing the borrower to
collect on the amounts owed under the note.214
In Amirfazli v. VATACS Group, Inc., 215 a lender advertised a
foreclosure sale for two of the four required consecutive weeks before
selling the mortgage to another lender. The new lender proceeded with
the previously scheduled foreclosure sale, even though it was not
identified in any of the published advertisements. The trial court
granted summary judgment for the borrower, finding that the foreclosure
sale was chilled as a matter of law because the last two advertisements
inaccurately identified the foreclosing lender.21 The Georgia Court of
Appeals concluded that even though the advertisements were incorrect,
there was evidence that the borrower was aware of the assignment.2 17
As a result, the court concluded that the record did not demonstrate
chilled bidding as a matter of law.2 1 It therefore reversed the summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further
consideration.2 19
In JIG Real Estate, LLC v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.,220 the
supreme court resolved a creative argument with regard to the rescission
of foreclosure sales.22' In the case, Countrywide rescinded a foreclosure sale and refunded the purchase price plus required interest to the
third party purchaser as required by O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1.222 The
third-party purchaser rejected the payment and sued, claiming that
O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 does not actually authorize the rescission of a
foreclosure sale and instead limits damages in a case where a rescission
was otherwise authorized. The trial court rejected this claim and
On appeal, the
granted summary judgment to Countrywide.223
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision and clearly

213. Id. at 726, 723 S.E.2d at 677.
214. Id. at 726, 723 S.E.2d at 678.
215. 311 Ga. App. 471, 716 S.E.2d 523 (2011).

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. at 472-73, 716 S.E.2d at 524-25.
Id. at 474, 716 S.E.2d at 525.
Id. at 474, 716 S.E.2d at 526.
Id.
289 Ga. 488, 712 S.E.2d 820 (2011).
Id. at 489, 712 S.E.2d at 822.
Id. at 488, 712 S.E.2d at 822; see also O.C.G.A. § 9-13-172.1 (2006).
JIG Real Estate, LLC, 289 Ga. at 488-89, 712 S.E.2d at 822.
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The
rejected the third-party purchaser's argument on this issue.
court held that the statute did, by its express terms, authorize the
rescission of foreclosure sales as long as the requirements of the statute
were met.225
At the time this Article was going to press, the court of appeals issued
a ruling that could have a dramatic effect on non-judicial foreclosures
across Georgia. In Reese v. Provident Funding, LLP, 22 1 the court
concluded that foreclosure was wrongful where a loan servicer sent
notice pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2,227 in which it represented
that it was the holder of the note and security deed, even though the
security deed had been executed in favor of Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc., and the servicer had sold and delivered the
note to a new lender.2" Based on these facts, the court reversed a
trial court decision granting summary judgment to the foreclosing
servicer on the borrowers' wrongful foreclosure claim and ordered the
trial court to instead enter summary judgment in favor of the borrowers. 229 O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2, on its face, does not require identification of the secured creditor, and prior to this decision, no Georgia court
had found that the non-judicial foreclosure statutes required the
identification of the secured lender.230 The court of appeals concluded
that the requirement should be read into the statute because the goal of
the statute was transparency in the foreclosure process.2 1 In a dissent
joined by two other judges, Judge Blackwell argued that the decision
amounted to an impermissible judicial rewriting of the statute.23 2 At
the time of this writing, it is not yet clear whether the supreme court
would review the decision on appeal.

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 489, 712 S.E.2d at 822.
Id.
730 S.E.2d 551 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-162.2 (2002 & Supp. 2012).
Reese, 730 S.E.2d at 555.
Id. at 551.
See O.C.GA. § 44-14-162.2.
Reese, 730 S.E.2d at 554.
Id. at 555-56 (Blackwell, J., dissenting).
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VIII. EMINENT DOMAIN
4 Dehco apIn Dehco, Inc. v. Fulton County Tax Commissioner,23
pealed the trial court's ruling that it was responsible for payment of ad
valorem property taxes on property condemned by the Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) in March 2008. The issue arose when the
trial court ruled on competing motions from the Fulton County Tax
Commissioner (Commissioner) and Dehco for the disbursement of the
DOT's deposit of just and adequate compensation. Dehco argued that
the ad valorem taxes should be allocated pro rata because it did not own
the property for the entire year.235 Citing statutory authority holding
each taxpayer responsible for taxes on all property owned on January 1
of the year preceding the ad valorem tax return, the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that Dehco was responsible for all the ad valorem taxes
owed for 2008.23 ' Accordingly, the court flatly rejected Dehco's invitation to apply pro rata tax allocation in a condemnation: "Absent an
agreement with the DOT to prorate those taxes, Dehco remained legally
obligated to pay the full amount of the taxes regardless of the subsequent transfer of title to the DOT."' 37 Dehco also argued the trial
court's interpretation of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-10 violated its constitutional
right to equal protection. Dehco argued that such an interpretation
allows DOT to engage in a coercive negotiation tactic that creates two
classes of condemnees, those who negotiate settlements before the
condemnation and those who do not.238 Holding that Dehco failed to
present this constitutional argument at the hearing and that the Georgia
Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over this area, the court of
appeals
did not consider the statute's constitutionality as applied in this
23 9
case.

Cobb County v. Robertson24 is the first of two cases concerning the
statutory requirements to object to the legal basis of a taking. Here,
Cobb County (County) filed a petition for condemnation in rem and a
declaration of taking with respect to real property owned by Morgan

233. This section was authored by Ivy Cadle, associate in the law firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Macon, Georgia. University of Georgia
(B.S., 2000; MAcc, 2002); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
234. 315 Ga. App. 889, 727 S.E.2d 531 (2012).

235. Id. at 889, 727 S.E.2d at 531-32.
236. Id. at 889-90, 727 S.E.2d at 532; see also O.C.G.A. § 48-5-10 (2010).
237. Dehco, 315 Ga. App. at 890, 727 S.E.2d at 532.

238. Id.
239. Id.
240. 314 Ga. App. 455, 724 S.E.2d 478 (2012).
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Robertson (Robertson). Robertson filed a timely petition to set aside the
taking, claiming the condemnation was not authorized. The trial court
scheduled a hearing on Robertson's motion, but it scheduled the hearing
to be held more than sixty days after the declaration of taking was
filed.2' Accordingly, the County waited until sixty days passed after
the declaration was filed and then moved to dismiss Robertson's petition,
asserting that O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c) 2 42 sets a mandatory sixty-day
period for holding such a hearing. 3
At issue for the court of appeals was the proper construction of
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11.2' That statute provides the following:
The presiding judge shall thereupon cause a rule nisi to be issued and
served upon the condemnor, requiring him to show cause at a time and
place designated by the judge why the title acquired by the declaration
of taking should not be vacated and set aside in the same way and
manner as is now provided for setting aside deeds acquired by fraud.
Such hearing shall be had not earlier than 15 days from the time of
service of the rule nisi upon the condemnor, nor later than 60 days
from the date of filing of the declaration of taking, and with the right
of appeal by either party, as in other cases.'
The trial court found that Robertson acted to the best of his ability in
accordance with O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11, and that "the failure to hold the
hearing [in sixty days] was not due to any fault or action by Robertson."24 6 Holding that the word "shall" need not be construed as
mandatory
in this instance, the court of appeals agreed with the trial
24 7
court.

Citing authority from the Georgia Supreme Court, the court of appeals
noted that a "statutory provision is generally regarded as directory
where a failure of performance will result in no injury or prejudice to the
substantial rights of interested persons, and as mandatory where such
injury or prejudice will result.""4s Holding that the statute did not
require a ruling within the sixty-day period, the court held that the
statute did not provide the County a substantive right to certainty with

241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 455, 724 S.E.2d at 478-79.
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c) (2012).
Robertson, 314 Ga. App. at 455-56, 724 S.E.2d at 479.
Id. at 456, 724 S.E.2d at 479.

245. O.C.G.A § 32-3-11(c).

246. Robertson, 314 Ga. App. at 456-57, 724 S.E.2d at 479.
247. Id. at 457, 724 S.E.2d at 480.
248. Id. at 457-58, 724 S.E.2d at 480 (alteration in orginal) (quoting Sanchez v. Walker
Cnty. Dep't of Family & Children Servs., 237 Ga. 406, 410, 229 S.E.2d 66, 69 (1976)).

2012]

REAL PROPERTY

283

regards to the finality of the County's condemnation
and hence the
9
provision was merely directory and not mandatory.2
The court also held that the legislature did not intend to deprive the
trial court of jurisdiction to consider the motion to set aside if the
hearing is not held in sixty days because the statute places the burden
to set a hearing on the court, not the condemnee.250 In reaching its
decision, the court also determined that the trial court's calendar is the
sole responsibility of the court, and that failure of the court to set a
hearing in sixty days "would fall solely and irreparably on the condemnee."l 5 Accordingly, the court held that the sixty-day period was
directory and not a mandatory provision. 52
Fincher Road Investments, LLLP v. City of Canton25 is the second
of two cases concerning filing requirements related to a petition to set
aside a taking. In this consolidated appeal, the City of Canton and the
Cobb County Marietta Water Authority (Condemnors) filed condemnation petitions and declarations of taking against multiple condemnees on
October 11, 2010. The condemnees filed timely petitions to set aside on
November 22, 2010, and a hearing was set for December 7, 2010.
Following a hearing on that date, the trial court dismissed the petitions
to set aside because the Condemnors were not provided with notice of
the hearing fifteen days before it occurred as is required by the plain
language of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11(c). The court reasoned it had no
discretion to hear the petition to set aside because the statute required
the Condemnors to receive the notice of the hearing fifteen days before
the hearing is conducted.2 54
Relying on its earlier reasoning in Robertson, the court of appeals held
that a superior court has the discretion to both hold a hearing outside
the sixty-day time period and to hold that hearing even if the Condemnors did not receive notice a full fifteen days before the hearing.255
Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment of the trial court and
remanded the case so the trial court could consider, as an exercise of its
discretion, whether "the Condemnees should be afforded an opportunity
for a hearing and a decision on the merits of their petitions to set aside
the [condemnation]. " S5'

249. Id. at 458, 724 S.E.2d at 480.
250. Id.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. at 458, 724 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 459, 724 S.E.2d at 481.
314 Ga. App. 852, 726 S.E.2d 120 (2012).
Id. at 852-53, 726 S.E.2d at 121.
Id. at 853, 726 S.E.2d at 121.
Id. at 853, 726 S.E.2d at 122.
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Keep an eye on this hot topic, indicated by these two recent cases from
the court of appeals. This issue was recently addressed by the Georgia
Supreme Court in another case where the parties were asked to address
whether the trial court erred in finding that it was the condemnees'
responsibility to obtain a rule nisi and a timely hearing on their motion
25 7
to vacate.
In Gwinnett County v. Ascot Investment Co.,25 a jury returned a
verdict awarding more than $3 million to Ascot Investment Company
(Ascot) and the Peoples Bank & Trust (Bank) (collectively, Condemnees).
The county appealed, claiming the trial court erred on four counts: first,
by admitting evidence of pre-taking damages; second, by failing to give
a requested charge that pre-taking damages are not recoverable; third,
by admitting evidence of proposed future development of the property
where that future development was hypothetical or speculative; and
fourth, by refusing to strike a juror based upon his difficulty understanding English.2 59 The court of appeals found no error and affirmed the
jury's verdict. 5 °
The court reviewed the evidence after citing the proposition that just
and adequate compensation does not include damage to the value of the
property before the date of taking as a result of mere anticipation that
the property will later be taken.26 ' The evidence showed that Ascot
purchased 28.606 acres from Gwinnett College in 2006, and that Ascot
then entered negotiations with a third-party developer who was
interested in purchasing a portion of the property to develop student
housing. Ascot and the developer signed an agreement in March of 2007
where the developer agreed to buy 19.03 acres of property for $8 million.
Before the closing, Ascot learned the county intended to condemn a
portion of the land that was also subject to the sale agreement.
Accordingly, Ascot and the developer entered an amended purchase
agreement for 17.6 acres to be sold at the same price per acre. The sale
closed in February 62of 2008, and the county filed its declaration of taking

in March of 2009.2

Even though it did not object to the introduction of either purchase
agreement, the county argued on appeal that testimony about the

257. Adkins v. Cobb County, 291 Ga. 521, 521,731 S.E.2d 665,666 (2012) (holding that

the duty of scheduling a hearing belongs to the trial court).
258. 314 Ga. App. 874, 726 S.E.2d 130 (2012).
259. Id. at 874, 726 S.E.2d at 132.

260. Id.
261.
262.

Id. at 874-75, 726 S.E.2d at 132; see also GA. CONST. art. 1, § 3, para. 1(a) (1983).
Gwinnett Cnty., 314 Ga. App. at 875, 726 S.E.2d at 132-33.
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2 63
original agreement was irrelevant evidence of pre-taking damages.
The court held that the testimony tended -to show the developer would
pay the same price per acre whether or not the contract included the
land that was taken.'" The court also determined that evidence that
the per acre price of the land never changed served to discredit the
testimony of the county's experts who testified that the topography of the
taken land made the part taken inferior to the land sold to the
developer.265
The court of appeals then disagreed with the county's assertion that
the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction that the
condemnees were not entitled to recover any losses resulting from the
mere anticipation that a taking would occur.266 The court first held
that there was no evidence of damages related to the anticipated
taking.267 Then, viewing the charge as a whole, the court held that the
trial court appropriately instructed the jury that it was only to
determine what constituted just and adequate compensation for the
property taken and the resulting consequential damages.266
Next, the court addressed the claim that the trial court erred by
admitting hypothetical and speculative evidence of the proposed future
development of Ascot's property.2 69 The county argued the trial court
should have excluded testimony of an expert witness concerning
financial feasibility studies and the practicality of developing student
housing on the property.27
In its review, the court cited the rule
allowing a jury to consider "'all legitimate purposes, capabilities and
uses' to which the property may be adapted, 'provided that such use is
reasonable and probable and not remote or speculative.'" 271 After
reviewing evidence that Ascot had the property rezoned and discussed
its development plans with the college, and that the college assured
Ascot of its continued growth and need for additional student housing,
the court of appeals was not convinced that the development of student
housing on the property was hypothetical or speculative.27 2

263. Id. at 875-76, 726 S.E.2d at 133.
264. Id. at 876, 726 S.E.2d at 133.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at 876-77, 726 S.E.2d at 134.
269. Id. at 877, 726 S.E.2d at 134.
270. Id.
271. Id. (quoting Carriage Hills Assoc. v. Mun. Elec. Auth. of Ga., 264 Ga. App. 192,
193, 590 S.E.2d 156, 158 (2003)).
272. Id. at 877-78, 726 S.E.2d at 134.
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Finally, the county argued the trial court erred when it refused to
strike a juror who was not sufficiently able to understand the English
language. That juror stated that he was not able to understand
technical language, but that his comprehension improved if someone
spoke slowly to him.273 Considering the fact that the juror had lived
in the United States since 1988 and that he works as a consultant and
instructor developing training seminars in English and Spanish, the
court acknowledged that the juror may have difficulty understanding
technical language used by some witnesses, but that many native
English speakers may have the same difficulty.274 Citing the authority
that a ruling on a juror's suitability may only be reversed upon a finding
of manifest abuse of discretion, the court held that the trial judge was
in the best position to determine whether the juror could sufficiently
understand English.2 75 Finding no276such abuse, the court of appeals
upheld the ruling of the trial judge.
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